TEXTO 3: Hydrocarbons and a New Strategic Region:
         The Caspian Sea and Central Asia
  FONTE: https://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/fmsopubs/issues/hydrocarbons/hydrocarbons.htm

Obs: Este é o original do qual foi feita a tradução que é o TEXTO 2.
Hydrocarbons and a New Strategic Region: The Caspian Sea and Central Asia
by Mr. Lester W. Grau, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth,
KS.
This article appeared in Military Review May-June 2001
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The  United  States  currently imports 51 percent of its  crude  oil—19.5
million  barrels  daily. The Energy Information Administration  estimates
that  by 2020, the United States will import 64 percent of its crude—25.8
million barrels per day.1 The United States buys much of its oil from Ven-
ezuela  and the Persian Gulf; Europe buys from the Persian Gulf  and  the
North  Sea. For years Europe has bought natural gas from the Soviet Union
and  Russia, but Eurasian oil has made limited inroads into the  European
market.  This  may change. The Caspian Sea appears to be sitting  on  yet
another  sea—a sea of hydrocarbons. Western oilmen flocking to  the  area
have  signed multibillion-dollar deals. US firms are well-represented  in
the  negotiations,  and  where US business goes,  US  national  interests
follow.
Well-dressed  urbanites pass stores with signs in  Russian,  English  and
Azeri in downtown Baku.
The  Caspian Sea basin has long been a source of oil and natural gas. The
fire-worshipping Zoroastrian religion was founded on the  western  shores
of the Caspian as Zoroastrians built temples around local pillars of fire
fed  by  escaping natural gas. The two great pre-World War I  oil  fields
were  in  Texas and the Caspian Sea region of Imperial Russia. After  the
war, when civil war raged between Russian Whites and Reds, British forces
landed  in Batumi in a failed attempt to influence the future of  Caspian
Sea  oil. During World War II, Adolph Hitler launched Operation  Blau  to
capture the Caspian Sea oil fields.
Now   that  the  Soviet  Union  has  dissolved,  Caspian  Sea  oil  draws
international attention once again. Western oil companies, hoping to find
new  reserves  at  a  reasonable cost, have cut  deals  with  Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Russia. Caspian region oil reserves might be
the third largest in the world (following Western Siberia and the Persian
Gulf)  and, within the next 15 to 20 years, may be large enough to offset
Persian  Gulf  oil. Caspian Sea oil and gas are not the only  hydrocarbon
deposits  in the region. Turkmenistan's Karakum Desert holds the  world's
third  largest  gas  reserves—three trillion  cubic  meters—and  has  six
billion  barrels of estimated oil reserves.2 Other oil fields in adjacent
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan further increase the known reserves
of  cheap  energy  available to oil-dependent economies and  are  drawing
outside investors.
The  presence  of these oil reserves and the possibility of their  export
raises  new  strategic concerns for the United States and  other  Western
industrial powers. As oil companies build oil pipelines from the Caucasus
and  Central Asia to supply Japan and the West, these strategic  concerns
gain  military implications. The dominant role of the Middle East  energy
supply  may be offset by new suppliers operating from an even less mature
and stable environment. The uninterrupted supply of oil to global markets
will continue to be a key factor in international stability.
Various  political, economic, sovereignty, military and  cultural  issues
could  threaten  uninterrupted delivery of oil from the  Caspian  region.
Should  the  United States continue to play a vigorous role in supporting
regional  stability,  US  Armed  Forces  will  need  to  understand   the
political,  economic and cultural dynamics, as well as  US  interests  in
this  region  where Western oil companies already have  signed  contracts
potentially  worth more than $100 billion. Hopefully, US forces  will  be
spared  future  regional presence beyond advisory  and  assistance  roles
since  effective  military  presence  would  require  basing  rights  and
significant  investment to develop theater infrastructure  and  establish
forward supply and staging areas.
The Persian Gulf, Caspian Sea, Russia and Central Asia
Petroleum geologists claim to have discovered 17 billion barrels of crude
oil in the Caspian Sea, an amount roughly equal to the European North Sea
fields  and almost one-third of Venezuela's holdings.3 Current  estimates
indicate  that, in addition to huge gas deposits, the Caspian  basin  may
hold  as  much  as  200  billion barrels of oil—33  times  the  estimated
holdings of Alaska's North Slope and a current value of $4 trillion.4  It
is  enough to meet the United States' energy needs for 30 years or more.5
This  sizable  estimation still does not match the Persian  Gulf  states'
estimated reserves. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Empire,  the
Caspian  region has assumed new global importance. Projected oil reserves
for  the  Iranian, Kazakh, Azeri, Turkmenian and Russian Caspian littoral
are  25  billion metric tons—nearly 15 percent of the world's  total  oil
reserves (and 50 percent of its gas reserves).6
During the Soviet era, Soviet oilmen extracted Caspian Sea oil mainly for
use within the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. The known Soviet Caspian Sea
oil  sites  had been producing for a century and were nearing  depletion.
Soviet  oil exploration and exploitation concentrated on sites that  were
more  geographically  and  technologically  accessible.  However,  recent
surveys  reveal oil reserves in the Caspian Sea that could  significantly
boost  the  economies  of  its five bordering states—Russia,  Azerbaijan,
Iran, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.
But  it  takes  money to make money; in this case, money to  exploit  the
difficult-to-reach  deposits,  money  to  remove  the  hydrosulfuric  and
mercaptan  contaminates from the east shore oil, money to deal  with  the
region's high geopressures, money to repressurize some of the prematurely
abandoned fields and money to move oil to the consumer. Since the  Soviet
Union did not develop advanced technological solutions to these problems,
Western  money  and technology are now key to exploiting  energy  in  the
region.  Predictions abound and most are probably overstated.  Still,  if
Western oil companies are able to begin producing oil from fields in  the
Caspian Sea, Central Asia and Russia, almost five million barrels of  oil
per day could be pumped from these fields into the open market by 2010.7
The Pipeline Blues
Bringing  oil and gas from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to market  is
difficult.  Pipelines  are  the  only feasible  way  to  move  commercial
quantities.  A major factor in developing Central Asian hydrocarbons  and
supporting  oil  and  gas pipelines is the price of  oil.  Recent  higher
prices  raise  the  prospects  for Caspian  Sea  energy,  but  they  also
encourage  reopening  some  closer, already-developed,  marginal  fields.
Transport costs affect oil prices. Transporting Persian Gulf oil costs $2
to $5 per ton; North Sea oil costs $10 per ton; Caspian Sea oil costs $17
per  ton; Siberian oil costs $35 to $45 per ton.8 Historically, the  only
pipeline from the Caspian Sea region ran through Chechnya via Baku-Grozny-
Novorossiysk.  Current uncertainty about political stability  is  holding
back  aggressive  pipeline  development;  however,  pipelines  are  being
planned, laid and used.
The  Russian  route.  Most Caspian Sea oil and  gas  are  pumped  through
Russia.  The  oil  flows  northwest and eventually  reaches  Russian  and
European markets through a well-developed pipeline system. Soon  it  will
again  move  to the Black Sea, bypassing Chechnya, for transport  through
the  Dardanelles  to the Mediterranean. Oil and gas are critical  to  the
struggling  Russian economy, in some years constituting 42 to 44  percent
of  all  exports.  The Russian government realized $1.5 billion  annually
from  direct foreign oil sales and raised 21 percent of its revenue  from
duties  on foreign trade—the biggest portion of which comes from oil  and
gas sales.9 Russia's neighbors complain that Russia asserts a proprietary
interest  over all Caspian Sea oil and uses the pipelines as leverage  in
negotiations. The Russians, who discovered the oil fields, developed them
and  built  the  transportation and refinery  infrastructure,  controlled
Caspian Sea energy for more than 100 years. The Russians feel entitled to
a  share and get it by controlling the flow of other nations' oil  across
Russian territory.
Thus, in spring 1996, Russia reduced the amount of oil it would transport
from  the  huge  Tengiz  oil field on the northeast  Caspian  shore.  The
Russians'  reason  for reducing the flow was that the Tengiz  oil  sulfur
content was too high and was damaging the pipe. This oil does have a high
sulfur content but was shipped from the same field through the same  pipe
for  many  years  when it belonged to the Soviet Union. Now  Chevron  and
Kazakhstan operate the field on a 50-50 basis. During the Soviet era,  no
one  counted  costs. With the reduced flow, Russia attempted  to  control
Kazakhstan's oil industry and economic viability. In 1997 the Caspian Sea
consortium of Chevron, Mobil, Russia's Lukoil, Oman and the Kazakh  state
oil company acceded to Russia's pressure and agreed to build a $2-billion
pipeline from Kazakhstan through Russia to Novorossiysk (Route 1).10 This
route maintains Russian control of oil shipment from the region.
The  historic  Russian  line from Baku through Chechnya  to  Novorossiysk
(Route  2)  was closed because of the Chechens' continuing struggle  with
Russia.  Both  sides  reportedly hit the pipeline during  the  wars,  and
Chechens  exploited it as a source of free oil. Reports from  the  region
indicate that Chechens placed more than 100 taps on the line, drawing off
oil to their clandestine refineries and selling cheap gasoline in Grozny.
Russia  has  recently completed a bypass around Chechnya and  reactivated
the  pipeline.  Russia  has proposed exporting  oil  north  to  join  its
existing pipeline system and reach Novorossiysk or Europe (Route 3). This
development could further remove the pipeline from Chechnya and  maintain
Russia's substantial control of Caspian Sea and Kazakh oil.
The  Transcaucasus route. The Azerbaijan International Operating  Company
(AIOC) is the first international oil consortium set up in Azerbaijan. US
oil  companies  own 39.9 percent of the consortium—Amoco,  17.0  percent;
Unocal,  10.0  percent;  Exxon, 8.0 percent; and Pennzoil,  4.8  percent.
Other   countries  in  the  consortium  include  Britain,  19.0  percent;
Azerbaijan,  10.0  percent; Russia's Lukoil, 10.0  percent;  Norway,  8.6
percent;  Japan, 3.9 percent; Turkey, 6.8 percent; and Saudi Arabia,  1.7
percent.11  This  consortium  built an initial  line  from  Baku  through
Georgia  to the Georgian port of Supsa on the Black Sea (Route  4).  This
pipeline has been pumping a limited amount of oil since l999. While  this
is  a relatively inexpensive option, the oil still has to move from Supsa
by  oil  tanker through the Black Sea and the Bosporus.12 Turkey controls
the  traffic between the Black and Mediterranean Seas and does  not  want
increased oil tanker traffic through the straits because of environmental
concerns.  Russia  objects to this route because  none  of  the  pipeline
passes  through  Russia. Further, this pipeline runs through  domains  of
many fractious mountain tribes.
The AIOC is also considering a line to the Turkish Mediterranean port  of
Ceyhan (Route 5). This would give Turkey primacy in exporting Caspian gas
and  oil, and would cut Russia out of pipeline fee profits and port  fees
from  Novorossiysk.  However, there are some  problems  with  building  a
pipeline to Ceyhan. The route runs through Azerbaijan and Armenia,  whose
war  over  Nagorno-Karabakh is at a stalemate.  Thus,  the  Baku-Armenia-
Ceyhan  route is not a near-term option. Should this conflict be settled,
the  route  also  passes  through the Kurdish  part  of  Turkey  where  a
suppressed  insurrection  still  simmers.  The  route  would  cost   $2.9
billion.13
The Clinton administration tried to promote a pipeline route from Baku to
Tbilisi to Supsa (Route 4) and then underwater from Supsa to Turkey where
it would cut across Kurdish Turkey to Ceyhan. An underwater pipeline from
Turkmenistan  across  the Caspian Sea to Baku would back  this  pipeline.
This  expensive  option required regional political  acceptance  and  oil
company backing—neither of which the Clinton administration could obtain.
The  Iranian  routes. The US government opposes a Baku-Iran-Ceyhan  route
because  of  Iran's  alleged support of international terrorism.  US  oil
companies are not allowed to ship their oil through Iran, although it  is
the  shortest,  cheapest  and  easiest route  to  an  open  port.  Iran's
preferred  route is a pipeline south from the Caspian Sea to the  Persian
Gulf  (Route  7).  Iran  has an extended pipeline system  in  place,  and
Turkmenistan  opened  a gas pipeline into Iran in December  1997.14  This
comparatively  inexpensive option would bring the  oil  and  gas  to  the
troubled Persian Gulf with its easily closed Strait of Hormuz. The United
States  opposes  this pipeline and tries to enforce  the  sanctions,  but
other  nations'  oil firms ignore the sanctions and cut  oil  deals  with
Iran.  France (Elf Aquitaine and Total SA); Italy (Agip); the Netherlands
(Royal  Dutch/Shell  and  Lamaj); Spain  (Repsol);  India  (BHP);  Russia
(Lukoil,  Zarubezhneft  and Mashinoim-port); and China  (China  National)
have  all  completed or are negotiating major oil deals with  Iran.15  US
firms  also  have  interests in such a route and have  been  lobbying  in
Washington, DC, for improved relations with Iran.
The  Afghanistan  route.  Several major oil companies  have  investigated
building   pipelines  from  Central  Asia  through  Herat  and  Kandahar,
Afghanistan,  and on to Quetta and Karachi, Pakistan,  (Route  8)  at  an
estimated  cost  of  $1.9 billion. The distance is relatively  short  and
would  bring  oil to the Indian subcontinent market. However, Afghanistan
is  still  locked  in civil war.16 Many area residents feel  that  Unocal
backed  the  Taliban  forces financially in return  for  future  pipeline
rights  in  Afghanistan.17  Unocal and  other  companies  have  abandoned
attempts  at establishing this route since the political situation  seems
unresolvable.
The  China route. China and the Pacific Rim are potentially huge  markets
for  Caspian  Sea and Central Asian oil. Oil companies are considering  a
pipeline  from western Kazakhstan through China to the Pacific  to  serve
the  Chinese, Japanese and Korean markets (Route 9). The savings realized
over current tanker deliveries would have to offset the $8 to $12 billion
required  to build the pipeline. The Chinese have signed a memorandum  of
understanding to build a shorter $3.5-billion pipeline that would stop in
China proper.18
Western Involvement and Concerns in Caspian Sea and Central Asian Energy
More than 40 upstream projects in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan involve 11 US
companies,  24  other  Western companies and two Russian  companies.  The
total  value  of these projects exceeds $100 billion. Companies  such  as
Exxon, Amoco, Mobil and Chevron were negotiating additional contracts  in
the  region  and  were  involved in upstream exploration  and  production
projects  as  well as various downstream activities—pipeline development,
infrastructure development, and environmental restoration and repair. Oil
profits represent the likely major revenue for the countries of the Trans-
caucasus and Central Asia for the next 15 to 20 years. Oil revenue  could
also  attract  other Western business to the region,  which  should  help
develop  infrastructure  and  diversify  their  economic  base.  US   oil
companies, smaller oil support and service companies, and engineering and
environmental  firms  would  benefit initially,  but  secondary  industry
attracted by the region's economic potential could also benefit. However,
the  region's  political  instability and US government  policies  toward
Azerbaijan have slowed or stopped many of these projects which peaked  in
1998.19
The  US Supreme Court has ruled that a US corporation has the same rights
as  an  individual citizen under the 14th Amendment to the  Constitution.
The  US  government could reasonably concern itself anywhere US  business
operates.20  But  in this era of multinational firms and joint  ventures,
what  is and is not a US business is open to interpretation. The concerns
of  business  may become the concerns of gov-ernment and,  by  extension,
military concerns. Oil company concerns in this region include the threat
of  nationalization; Russia's role in the affairs of its former colonies;
the   final  division  of  Caspian  Sea  resources  among  Russia,  Iran,
Azerbaijan,  Kazakh-stan  and  Turkmenistan;  the  future  of  US-Iranian
relations  with  its  impact on energy production and  distribution;  the
impact  of  Western countries and Japan cutting deals with Iran  separate
from  US  oil  company interests; how far Russia might go to protect  its
perceived interests; and pipeline security.
Azerbaijan  social  and security concerns. Oil has not  brought  national
prosperity to this region's people.21 Azerbaijan provides a good example.
Oil  has  transformed  Baku  from a provincial  Soviet  capital  into  an
international  city with a new airport, new hotels and a modern  downtown
business area.
An  oil  derrick on the Caspian Sea coast with a motorist water point  in
the  foreground. Aging but serviceable oil infrastructure covers the land
and sea of Azerbaijan.
The  transformation  from  the gray Soviet  past  is  striking.  Fountain
Square,  with  its McDonald's, fashionable shops, cafes and new  business
buildings, speaks of wealth and connections to the developed world. There
are  many  well-dressed young women and no sign of the  chador,  a  large
cloth  used  as  a head covering, veil or shawl. But in  a  city  of  1.7
million,  the  small Western part is surrounded by poverty,  unemployment
and  collapsing infrastructure. Most citizens shop in open  bazaars.  The
elite have grown richer and left the rest of the city behind. Most common
folks respect President Heydar Aliyev because he brought order, but  they
complain of terrible economic conditions—a teacher makes $20 per month to
support  a  family,  while others cannot find work at all.  Bright  young
entrepreneurs  are trying to leave the country. For many,  the  oil  boom
seems to have already played out. The litany among older citizens is that
life was much better under communism.
East  meets West. A Russian Grandfather Frost and Mickey Mouse greet  New
Year's crowds in nominally Islamic Baku.
International investment connected with Caspian Sea oil has not  been  as
vast or influential as expected. The Azeri national trauma is the Nagorno-
Karabakh  war,  and the one million refugees who live on the  margins  of
society  are  constant  reminders. The  national  passion  is  to  regain
Karabakh. Large numbers of Chechens who fled the Russian-Chechen wars add
to  the  refugee population. Azeri military presence is not  conspicuous,
but regular and special police are prominent.
Turkey  and Iran battle for influence. Turkey's influence is secular  and
addresses   economic,  cultural  and  political  transformation.   Iran's
influence  is religious and conservative-reactionary, and speaks  to  the
myth  that  fundamentalist  Shia  Islam would  rectify  the  new  order's
injustices.  So  far,  there  seems to be little  evidence  that  Islamic
fundamentalism  has made any inroads into Baku. Russian presence  remains
pervasive  in  terms  of speech on the streets and  national  norms.  New
Year's  is  celebrated  in traditional Russian manner,  with  Grandfather
Frost  and Mickey Mouse thrown in for good measure. Islam is relaxed  and
alcohol  is  common.  Before  the  Communist  Revolution,  Baku   was   a
cosmopolitan city and an oil town. Post-Soviet Baku is still cosmopolitan
but would like to become a petroleum giant. Short of that, it will settle
for Aliyev's version of order.
Many  of Azerbaijan's eight million people live in the country. Many  are
peasants   whose  farming  and  livestock  are  unaffected  by   advanced
technology. The central part of Azerbaijan is fairly arid, and the  north
is  forested with birch and oak. High-quality apples, melons, nuts,  oats
and  grapes  are  prominent  crops. Main  roads  are  in  disrepair,  and
secondary  roads  are  mud  tracks for four-wheel-drive  vehicles.  Large
numbers  of  unemployed men stand about on workdays. Few  young  men  and
women  are visible in the countryside, perhaps indicating flight  to  the
cities. Factories closed with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and power
outages are so common that people ignore them. The contrast between  Baku
and  the countryside will continually bring people into the capital where
the  newcomers will join the displaced refugees from Karabakh. The  Azeri
government lacks the means and will to provide social services  for  this
marginalized population. Whoever organizes those services will  have  the
political leverage to shape Azerbaijan's future.
Azerbaijan is nominally a Shia Islam country, but the call to  prayer  is
not  heard  in Baku. The proscriptions against alcohol are not  observed,
and  women  are  not  in purdah—secluding them from  public  observation.
However,  mosques  are reopening, and many new ones are  being  built  as
gifts  from  Iran. Reasonably priced Iranian religious material  is  sold
outside many of these mosques.
Russian  President  Putin's motorcade rushes  past  a  Chevron  billboard
(left) during his visit to Baku, January 2001.
Russian  President  Vladimir  Putin  visited  Baku  in  January  2001  to
demonstrate  that  Russia  is still a major factor  in  the  area.  Putin
mounted a political assault on the notion that Azerbaijan could or should
link  its  future  to  the Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan,  Azerbaijan  and
Moldova  (GUUAM)  group as a counterweight to Moscow.  Putin  stressed  a
broad  range of economic benefits Russia could offer Azerbaijan and  made
it clear that Russian forces compelled to leave Georgia would redeploy to
Armenia,  having  backed Armenia during the Azeri- Armenian  war.  Rather
than  risk  heavy  Russian pressure, the Aliyev  government  honored  the
Russian  president. Putin won cooperation on energy rights in the Caspian
region  and  pledged  support to Azerbaijan's  territorial  integrity  in
settling  Karabakh. Putin spoke of a solution to regional problems  as  a
matter  for  negotiation and cooperation among the Caucasus  Four—Russia,
Azer-baijan, Armenia and Georgia. The Azeri press noted that he  did  not
mention Iran or Turkey as Caucasian states.
The Azeri government seems to have tacked to a Russian line, in part,  as
a  result  of  Russian  hardball  regional  policies  following  military
intervention  in  Chechnya. Only days before  Putin's  arrival  in  Baku,
Moscow  had cut off Georgia's supply of natural gas, plunging the country
into  the  cold and dark. Russia had accused Georgia of allowing Chechnya
to use its territory and had threatened to eliminate the Chechen presence
forcefully, with or without Georgian cooperation. Aliyev's government has
calculated  that  confronting Putin involves too  much  risk.  Azerbaijan
clearly  needs  Russian  economic  and  technical  assistance  with   its
collapsing infrastructure.
Russia  also  has influence over Karabakh, especially if Azerbaijan  sees
the  West  embracing Armenian interests at the expense of Azerbaijan  and
Turkey—its  closest  Western  friends.  Azeris  speculate  about  another
rationale  for  the  latest  tack toward  Russia.  Domestic  politics  in
Azerbaijan  has  been  fueled by running speculation  about  presidential
succession  after  Aliyev,  who  has been ill.  Russian  intervention  to
support  some faction could undermine stability, so Azerbaijan  needs  an
early  understanding  with  Russia and its  interests.  The  Azeri  press
presented the Putin visit as a Russian victory and a US loss.
Operational  concerns  and pipeline security. Military  security  of  the
Caspian  Sea  region  is difficult. The various regional  militaries  are
small,  un-derresourced  and better designed for  theater  war  than  for
combating  guerrillas, narcotraffickers and gangs who threaten the  area.
It  is  difficult  for outside forces to access the area.  The  west-east
route  from  the  Black Sea through Georgia to Baku  is  easily  cut  and
supports a limited line of communications. Primary access routes into the
Baku area for division and larger forces are north and south—through Iran
or  Russia. These access routes each have two poorly maintained  two-lane
roads  and a set of double railroad tracks. A well-placed battalion could
close  the  access routes indefinitely at some points and could  only  be
dislodged by an amphibious end run.
The region is politically unstable, and most proposed pipeline routes run
through  areas  of  current  or  recent conflict.  Who  will  secure  the
pipelines  and at what price? AIOC representatives have met with  Chechen
leaders  who  stated  that  no oil would flow  through  any  pipeline  in
Chechnya,  Georgia or the Transcaucasus unless they received a  share  of
the  consortium. Similar difficulties exist along other proposed pipeline
routes.  Currently, Russia is losing major quantities of oil and  gas  in
the pipeline that runs through Ukraine into Europe. Despite Russia's best
efforts,  it cannot negotiate safe passage of energy in a fairly  settled
region.22
During the Soviet-Afghan war, the Soviets built tactical pipelines  along
the  eastern (Termez to Bagram) and western corridors (Kushka  to  Shind-
and).  Although  the Mujahideen preferred more heroic attacks  on  Soviet
convoys  and  forces  to  mundane attacks on  pipelines,  the  Mujahideen
conducted  enough  attacks  on  the  Soviet  pipelines  to  tie  down   a
significant  number of forces. Sometimes the Soviets lost more  than  500
metric tons of petroleum, oils and lubricants (POL) in a day. The average
pipeline  break  cost  20  to 25 tons. The Soviets  patrolled  pipelines,
established security outposts along them in high-risk areas and cut deals
with local chieftains to exchange POL for pipeline security. Despite  all
this,  the modern mechanized Soviet force never could guarantee  pipeline
security.23
In  the next 10 to 15 years, oil and gas exports from the Caspian Sea and
Central  Asia could possibly match those from the Persian Gulf,  although
this  projection may be based on optimistic estimates. The United  States
considers  the Persian Gulf an area of vital interest. Will  the  Caspian
Sea  region  also  become  an area of vital interest?  Increased  Western
commercial  activity, US strategic interests and US  law  point  in  that
direction. If so, the United States should examine its relationship  with
Russia,  Iran,  Turkey and the other regional states.  Developing  a  new
market  source of inexpensive energy would provide an alternative  during
tense  or  crisis situations. Should a rogue power close  the  Strait  of
Hormuz  or  organize a global cut in production, this  new  region  would
provide  alternatives to armed confrontation or diplomatic  capitulation.
However,  this new region is not easily accessible to the West  and  will
create  new  security  concerns  that  eventually  will  affect  military
planners.
A  mosque  nears  completion at the "Five Fingers," a  sacred  geological
site,  as  vendors  wait for customers for their  US  and  regional  soft
drinks. Neighboring Iran has funded largely Azerbaijan's huge upsurge  in
mosque construction.
Turkey  declined  an  Azeri government invitation  to  build  a  base  in
Azerbaijan.  A Turkish presence in this area could work to US  advantage,
but  Russia  is  openly opposed to such basing. To date, US  attempts  at
presence have been spectacular but hardly sustainable. In September 1997,
500  soldiers of the 82d Airborne Division flew 12,500 kilometers  in  19
hours  to  conduct an airborne drop in Kazakhstan. Retiring commander  in
chief, US Atlantic Command, Marine Corps General John J. Sheehan led  the
drop.  Although the paratroopers participated in a regional  peacekeeping
exercise  with  troops from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,  Georgia,
Latvia,  Turkey  and Russia, many in the region saw the  US  move  as  an
advertisement  for  US power-projection capability. Sheehan  stated  that
"The  message,  I guess, is that there is no nation on the  face  of  the
earth  that we cannot get to."24 The fundamental question is whether  the
United States can maintain a meaningful presence there during a crisis or
conflict.
An airhead in an underdeveloped theater thousands of kilometers away from
theater   logistics  stocks  is  not  power  projection,  nor   are   500
paratroopers  an  operational force. Should the United States  decide  it
needs  to get more involved in this region, it should begin with advisory
and  assistance efforts to promote regional stability. There are have and
have-not  nations and groups in the region. An agreement with  one  party
will  often  make  an implacable enemy of another. Hopefully,  commercial
well-being will transfer to national and regional well-being—though  this
has  seldom been the case with oil wealth—and the region will ensure  the
safe transit of oil and gas without any outside interference.
Should  the  United States decide to establish a strong presence  in  the
area,  it  would  have  to create the supporting  logistics  and  staging
infrastructure  in  advance. This would be an expensive  step,  requiring
expenditure of domestic and international political capital; approval  of
local  nations;  a  clear  vision of US future strategic  interests;  and
construction and maintenance of a new, large overseas base.25  Perhaps  a
wiser approach is to promote closer relations and provide additional  aid
to our long-term regional partner, Turkey.
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1.  S.  Rob  Sobhani,  "Tapping into a Pipe Dream," Washington  Times,  1
February  2001,  17.  Much of this article is based on  Lester  W.  Grau,
"Petroleo y Gas Natural del Mar Caspio, y Asia Central," Spanish-language
edition of Military Review (March-April 1998), 73-81.
2.  Ahmed  Rashid,  "Power Play," Far Eastern Economic Review  (10  April
1997), 22.
3.  Tyler  Marshall, "Caspian Sea: Oil in a Tinderbox," The  Kansas  City
Star  (8  March 1998), K-6; the oil reserves of Venezuela are  some  63.3
billion  barrels.  See "Venezuela," Jane's Sentinel  (Jane's  Information
Group, 1995), 26.
4. Ruth Daniloff, "Waiting for the Oil Boom," Smithsonian (January 1998),
26; Extrapolated from Marshall.
5.  Stephen Kinzer, "Pipe Dreams: A Perilous New Contest for the Next Oil
Prize," The New York Times (24 September 1997), IV-1.
6.  Discussions  with  Garrett Fonda and Tom  Banks  of  Foreign  Systems
Research  Center of Greenwood Village, Colorado. The size of the  Caspian
oil reserves are a matter of continued conjecture. Some sources put it at
10 percent of the world's oil reserves or five times US oil reserves. See
Sobhani.
7. Fonda and Banks. Sobhani estimates that the 5-million-daily production
will be achieved earlier in 2005.
8.  Timothy L. Thomas, "Russian National Interests and the Caspian  Sea,"
Perceptions (December 1999-February 2000), 75-96.
9.  Leslie Dienes, "The Russian Oil and Gas Sector: Implications  of  the
New Property System," The National Bureau of Asian Research (March 1996),
22.
10.  "Pipeline  Poker," The Economist, (7 February 1998),  8;  a  special
Central  Asia  survey insert. Map is derived from the map  used  in  this
article.
11.  Carol  J. Williams, "Caspian Sea Change: Moscow, Through  Oil  Giant
Lukoil,  is Taking a More Pragmatic Approach in the Quest for its  Former
Colonies' Natural Bounty," Los Angeles Times (8 December 1996), extracted
from the Internet. The figures have been rounded off.
12. "Pipeline Poker."
13.  Ibid.  Moving  oil  by supertanker is cheaper  than  moving  oil  by
pipeline, but supertankers cannot operate in the Dardanelles.
14. Ibid.
15.  Bhushan Bahree, "Demands for Oil Influence Policy in Gulf," The Wall
Street Journal (23 February 1998), A17.
16. "Pipeline Poker," 11.
17.  Comments to the author during an extended sojourn in Pakistan during
fall 1996.
18. "Pipeline Poker."
19.  Armenia  and Azerbaijan have been fighting over the Nagorno-Karabakh
region since 1988. The Soviet Union backed Armenia and invaded Azerbaijan
in  January 1990—occupying Sumgait and Baku. Armenia now holds 20  to  25
percent of Azeri's territory. Azerbaijan blockaded land-locked Armenia in
response. The US Congress imposed Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support
Act  on  Azerbaijan. This prohibits virtually all US  government  aid  to
Azerbaijan.  Section 907 stipulates that the United  States  cannot  give
assistance  until hostilities cease and Azerbaijan halts its blockade  of
Armenia  and  the  breakaway  Nagorno-Karabakh  region.  The  legislative
restrictions  assume that Azerbaijan is the aggressor and  Azerbaijan  is
violating  norms  of  international conduct  by  maintaining  a  blockade
against  its  neighbor. The blockade has caused hardship to  Armenia.  US
economic and humanitarian aid has supported Armenia. Section 907  hinders
the   United  States'  ability  to  influence  Azerbaijan's  development,
inhibits  efforts  to  diversify the US  energy  supply  and  damages  US
economic interests.
20. In the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration determined that access to
international oil was a US strategic concern and that antitrust laws  did
not  apply to international oil corporations. See Burton Ira Kaufman, The
Oil  Cartel Case: A Documentary Study of Antitrust Activity in  the  Cold
War  Era, and Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy,  1953-
1961.
21.  The author visited Baku 20 years ago and again in January 2001  with
his  associate,  Dr. Jacob Kipp. Much of this section is based  on  their
impressions from these visits.
22.  Discussions the author had with acquaintances in Moscow in  December
1997.
23. Boris V. Gromov, Organichennyy kontinge [Limited Contingent] (Moscow:
Progress, 1994), 289-90.
24.  Hugh  Pope, "US Plays High-Stakes War Games in Kazakstan," The  Wall
Street Journal (16 September 1997), A16.
25.  For  further background, see the following Conflict Studies Research
Centre  studies: Charles Blandy, "The Caspian: A Sea of Troubles,"  1997;
"Oil  is  not the Only Stake," 1997; "The Impact of Baku Oil on  Nagornyy
Karabakh,"  1997; and "The Caspian: A Catastrophe in the  Making,"  1997.
Michael   Off,   "The   Regional  Military  Balance:   Conventional   and
Unconventional  Military Forces Around the Caspian," 1995.  An  excellent
history  of  the  region is Dilip Hiro, Between Marx  and  Muhammad:  The
Changing  Face  of  Central  Asia (Glasgow:  Harper  Collins,  1994).  An
excellent history of oil is Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest  for
Oil, Money and Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).
[ Volta ]